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11 Introduction
This study aims to investigate the potentially adverse eﬀects of macroe-
conomic uncertainty on the allocation of banks’ loanable funds. We argue
that as banks must acquire costly information on borrowers before extending
loans to new or existing customers, uncertainty about economic conditions
(and the likelihood of loan default) would have clear eﬀects on their lending
strategies over and above the movements of macroeconomic aggregates or
the constraints posed by monetary policymakers’ actions.1
We conjecture that higher uncertainty will hinder managers’ ability to
accurately predict returns from available lending opportunities. Beaudry,
Caglayan and Schiantarelli (2001) present a theoretical argument and em-
pirical evidence that an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty reduces the
cross-sectional dispersion of ﬁrms’ investment rate and distorts their alloca-
tion of resources. Along the same lines, Baum, Caglayan, Ozkan and Ta-
lavera (2006) arrive at similar conclusions when analyzing ﬁrms’ cash/total
asset ratios and their convergence in times of uncertainty. In our context, we
expect that when macroeconomic environment is tranquil, bank managers
will be able to predict returns from each potential project more easily and
channel funds towards projects with higher expected returns. Contrarily,
when the economic environment is in turmoil, bank managers’ ability to pre-
dict returns accurately will be hindered rendering more conservative lending
behavior across all banks. This argument implies that during times of higher
1Our approach diﬀers from that employed in earlier research on banks’ behavior under
uncertainty. See for instance Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet
(2000), Thakor and Udell (1984).
2macroeconomic uncertainty banks will behave more homogeneously, caus-
ing the cross-sectional distribution of banks’ loan-to-asset ratios to narrow.
During times of low uncertainty banks will have more latitude to behave
idiosyncratically, leading to a widening of the cross-sectional distribution of
banks’ loan-to-asset ratios. In this view, stability of the macroeconomic en-
vironment will favor more eﬃcient allocation of loanable funds. Buttressing
this argument, a recent article2 states that given the current uncertainty
in the economic environment, banks are curtailing loans to American busi-
nesses, depriving even healthy companies of money for expansion and hiring
whereas a few years ago they were eager to extend loans to their customers.
To test this hypothesis we use quarterly U.S. bank-level data covering a
quarter-century period extracted from the Federal Reserve System’s Com-
mercial Bank and Bank Holding Company database. Our results provide
strong support for the hypothesis that macroeconomic uncertainty distorts
the allocation of banks’ loanable funds. We ﬁnd a clear negative associa-
tion between proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty and the cross-sectional
variability of banks’ loan-to-asset ratios. Banks’ lending behavior becomes
more homogeneous in times of increased uncertainty. Our results are ro-
bust to the introduction of several other variables controlling for changes
in monetary policy and the macroeconomic environment: the Federal funds
rate, the inﬂation rate, the index of leading indicators, and an indicator of
regulatory changes. We present our empirical ﬁndings below.
2“Worried Banks Sharply Reduce Business Loans”, New York Times, July 28, 2008.
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2.1 Bank data
We extract data for total loans and total assets from the Federal Reserve
System’s Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company (BHC) database.
The extract of this data set employed here covers essentially all banks in the
U.S. on a quarterly basis from 1979Q1–2003Q3, providing us with a total of
1,241,206 bank-quarters. Our deﬁnitions correspond to those provided by
on-line documentation of Kashyap and Stein (2000).3
2.2 The reduced form model
We consider the following reduced form relationship:
Dispt(Lit/TAit) = β0 + β1ˆ ht + et, (1)
where Dispt(Lit/TAit) is the standard deviation of the cross-sectional dis-
persion of banks’ loan-to-asset (LTA) ratios at time t, ˆ ht represents macroe-
conomic uncertainty proxied by the conditional variance of industrial pro-
duction or CPI inﬂation evaluated at time t, and et is an i.i.d. error term.
The advantage of this approach is that we can relate the behavior of bank
loans directly to a measurable proxy for economic uncertainty. If our con-
jecture is supported by the data, β1 should take a negative sign.4
3We obtain qualitatively similar ﬁndings when we use the Standard and Poor’s Bank
COMPUSTAT data set, which includes a subset of the largest U.S. commercial banks.
These results are available upon request.
4Although ˆ ht is a generated regressor, the coeﬃcient estimates for equation (1) are
consistent; see Pagan (1984) and Pagan (1986).
4Our proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty, ˆ ht, are derived from monthly
industrial production (International Financial Statistics series 66IZF) and
from consumer price inﬂation (IFS series 64XZF). In each case, we ﬁt a
generalized ARCH (GARCH) model to the series, where the mean equation
is an autoregression (AR(1) for industrial production, AR(2) for inﬂation).5
The conditional variance derived from this GARCH model for each proxy,
averaged to quarterly frequency, is then used as our measure of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty (ˆ ht). In our estimated models, we use either the contem-
poraneous conditional variance or a weighted average of the current and last
three quarters’ conditional variances, with arithmetic weights 0.4, 0.3, 0.2,
0.1.
The behavior of average loan-to-asset ratios is displayed in Figure 1,
juxtaposed with the macroeconomic uncertainty proxies over the sample
period. It is evident that the volatility of industrial production has declined
over the sample period, while inﬂation volatility ﬁrst fell then rose sharply
since the mid-1990s. Banks’ reliance on loans has generally increased since
1990.
2.3 Empirical results
The relation between the dispersion of banks’ LTA ratios and macroeco-
nomic uncertainty is presented in Table 1. The dependent variable measures
the standard deviation of the LTA ratio. We enter an indicator, (d BA) for
1992Q1 and beyond to capture the eﬀect of the full implementation of Basel
Accord risk-based capital standards on banks’ lending behavior. We con-
sider both contemporaneous uncertainty measures (CV IP and CV Infl)
5Details of the GARCH models for CPI and IP are given in the Appendix.
5and current and three quarters’ lagged eﬀects of the proxies for macroeco-
nomic uncertainty, CV IP 03 and CV Infl 03. All estimated models in-
clude the Federal funds rate to capture the stance of monetary policy, d BA
for the Basel Accord and a time trend to reﬂect secular movements in bank
lending behavior and the level of macroeconomic uncertainty. In columns
5 and 6 of Table 1, we present results of regressions including two addi-
tional control variables: the rate of CPI inﬂation and the detrended index
of leading indicators (computed from DRI-McGraw Hill Basic Economics
series DLEAD) to further test the robustness of our results.
The table presents instrumental variables–generalized method of mo-
ments (IV-GMM) regression results with HAC (heteroskedasticity- and auto-
correlation consistent) standard errors for each of the proxy series.6 Columns
1 and 2 provide estimates of our baseline regressions. The coeﬃcients on
both measures of uncertainty are negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
as are the measures in columns 3 and 4 based on distributed lags of the
conditional variances. In columns 5 and 6 we arrive at similar ﬁndings: the
coeﬃcients of uncertainty are signiﬁcant and negative. For each model, as
one would expect, the Federal funds rate is also signiﬁcant along with the
time trend and the Basel Accord dummy.
To gain some insight on the economic signiﬁcance of these results, we
compute elasticities of the dependent variable with respect to uncertainty (ˆ η)
and use them to calculate the eﬀect of a 100 per cent increase in uncertainty
6Instruments used include several lagged values of both conditional variance series.
The J statistic in these tables is Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions, with their
p-values given below.
6as captured by the conditional variances of IP and CPI inﬂation.7 We ﬁnd
that at the end of one year the dispersion of the LTA ratio declines by
6%–10%: a quite substantial magnitude in economic terms, indicating that
higher macroeconomic uncertainty distorts the allocation of loanable funds.
The evidence we gather from Table 1 can be summarized as follows.
Macroeconomic uncertainty has an important role in the allocation of loan-
able funds as captured by movements in the cross-sectional dispersion of
banks’ loan-to-asset ratios. Importantly, this eﬀect is signiﬁcant even when
we control for the stance of monetary policy and macroeconomic conditions.
3 Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that uncertainty about macroeconomic conditions
should have clear eﬀects on the allocation of loanable funds over and above
the movements of macroeconomic aggregates or the constraints posed by
monetary policymakers’ actions. We provide robust evidence that macroe-
conomic uncertainty signiﬁcantly distorts the allocation process, and that
the magnitude of eﬀects that we ﬁnd in this paper is qualitatively impor-
tant: a change of 6% to 10% in the dispersion of banks’ loan-to-asset ratios in
response to a doubling of macroeconomic uncertainty. This is a quite sub-
stantial magnitude in economic terms implying that the second moments
matter and should not be ignored by economic policymakers.
7For the sample period under consideration, the mean conditional variance (at a quar-
terly frequency) for IP is 0.0400, with values ranging from 0.0207 to 0.1256. Similar ﬁgures
for the conditional variance of the CPI inﬂation rate are 0.0859, 0.0248 and 0.2403. Hence,
it should be no surprise to see a doubling of uncertainty in some periods as well as its
halving in some others.
7Appendix: Proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty
Table A1. GARCH models proxying macroeconomic uncertainty
(1) (2)
log(IP) log( ˙ P)
log(IP)t−1 0.979
[0.012]***
log( ˙ P)t−1 1.246
[0.053]***





















Standard errors in brackets
Models are ﬁt to detrended log(IP) and log ˙ P.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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9Table 1: Results for Disp(L/TA), 1980Q4–2003Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV IP -0.420***
(0.050)










FedFunds -0.115*** -0.181*** -0.124*** -0.189*** -0.211*** -0.296***
(0.032) (0.038) (0.030) (0.035) (0.049) (0.055)
d BA -0.009** -0.021*** -0.009** -0.018*** -0.007 -0.014**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
t 0.210* 0.413*** 0.172* 0.378*** 0.135 0.234*
(0.091) (0.101) (0.087) (0.105) (0.091) (0.109)
Constant 0.181*** 0.175*** 0.184*** 0.175*** 0.184*** 0.181***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Quarters 92 92 92 92 92 92
ˆ η -0.100 -0.069 -0.103 -0.060 -0.092 -0.057
s.e. 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009
J 6.985 7.804 5.884 10.364 7.313 10.649
J pvalue 0.430 0.350 0.553 0.169 0.397 0.155
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 1,241,206 bank-quarter observations.
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Figure 1: LTA Ratio and Uncertainty Proxies
11